University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 2 Volume 22 Issue 2 (Spring 2015)

Article 4

5-1-2015

The Corporation as Victim of White Collar Crime: Results from a
Study of German Public and Private Companies
Dr. Hendrik Schneider

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Dr. Hendrik Schneider, The Corporation as Victim of White Collar Crime: Results from a Study of German
Public and Private Companies, 22 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 171 (2015)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol22/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami International and Comparative
Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

THE CORPORATION AS VICTIM OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME:
RESULTS FROM A STUDY OF GERMAN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
COMPANIES

Dr. Hendrik Schneider'
I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

THE EMERGENCE OF CORPORATE CRIME AND VICTIMOLOGY AS

FIELDS OF STUDY
III.

.........................................
................................

171

......... 172

THE CURRENT STUDY: THE CORPORATION AS VICTIM OF WHITE-

COLLAR CRIME
....................................
A. DESIGN OF THE STUDY.........................

...... 177
177

B.

ANALYSIS OF THE QUANTITATIVE RESULTS............178

C.

ANALYSIS OF THE QUALITATIVE RESULTS...............198

1.

CONTROL BY A SECOND MANAGER .................. 198

2.

CONTROL BY A SUPERVISORY BOARD................

3.
4.

CONTROL BY A WORKS COUNCIL.......
....... 200
CONTROL BY AN AUDITOR
.................. 200

5.

CONTROL BY CHANGED PROBLEM AWARENESS OR
EMERGENCE OF A CHARISMATIC GUARD..........

D.

199

201

TYPOLOGY OF COMPANIES ACCORDING TO

IV.

VICTIMIZATION RISK...........
................ 202
E. LEAVING THE VICTIM ROLE BEHIND.......
......
203
CONCLUSION
.....................................
......
205

I.

INTRODUCTION

White-collar crime 2 and victimology are well-known fields
within criminology since the last half of the 20th century. One area
1 Dr. Hendrik Schneider, Professor of Law, University of Leipzig. His research
focuses on white-collar crime, criminology, and compliance. He acts as counsel on
corporate- and medical- criminal cases and advises on matters surrounding issues of
economic transactions and investigations. Additionally, he is a compliance
consultant with particular emphasis on the healthcare industry, including risk
analysis, development and implementation of internal guidelines, change
management, employee training, and sustainable protection. Caitlin Hickey, JD,
LL.M, Esq., assisted with research and writing.
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that deserves more attention is a combination of the following: 1)
Why does a corporation become a victim? 2) What weakens a
corporation and makes it vulnerable for the white-collar offender and
against corporate or occupational crime? To this end, a study was
undertaken in Germany of private and public sector companies with
the goal of gaining in-depth knowledge on a specific type of
victimization: the corporation as a victim of white-collar crime.
Another important goal was to determine how different compliance
measures affect the victim status and health of the company.
The results of this comprehensive study were originally
published in Germany.3 What follows here is an overview. While the
findings only concern German companies, it is relevant for an
international audience because similar trends occur elsewhere. The
first part of this article addresses background information regarding
white-collar crime and victimology. Such concepts are necessary to
understand before presenting the results of the study.
II.

THE EMERGENCE OF CORPORATE CRIME AND VICTIMOLOGY
AS FIELDS OF STUDY

Criminology long focused on "conventional" crimes such as
street crime, crime of poverty, and hate crime (i.e. homicide, robbery,
rape, etc.) and thus ignored white-collar crime altogether. But if one
were to anoint a "father of the criminology of white collar crime,"
then it would be Edwin Sutherland because he was the first to coin
this phrase in his 1939 speech before the American Sociological
Society.4 In his further work, Sutherland developed a definition of

2White-collar

crime can also be referred to as economic crime or corporate crime.
3 This article references the results from a study originally published in Germany in
2013. For the original German version, see Hendrik Schneider & Dieter John, Das
Unternehmen als Opfer von Wirtschaftskriminalitat: eine viktimologische
Untersuchung: Public und Private Sector im Vergleich (2013), available at
http://www.uni-

leipzig.de/-prozess/resources/Publikationen/RP StudieWikri 130215-ansichtgesichert.pdf.
4 For

the text of his speech see Edwin Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM.
Soc. REV. 1 (1940). For scholars claiming Sutherland was the first to address whitecollar crime, see DAVID 0. FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED CRIMINALS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 2 (4th ed. 2010); HAZEL CROALL, UNDERSTANDING
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white-collar crime as "crime committed by a person of respectability
and high social status in the course of his occupation." 5 Despite
Sutherland's early attempt at defining white-collar crime, the
definition has been contested. Perhaps the most humorous critique
comes from David Nelken, who wrote "if Sutherland merited a
Nobel Prize, as Mannheim thought, for pioneering this field of study,
he certainly did not deserve it for the clarity or serviceableness of his
definition." 6
A better definition of white-collar crime is one that was
proposed by a group of criminologists whose task was to establish a
definition. Accordingly, the following definition was widely agreed
upon: "White-collar crimes are illegal or unethical acts that violate
fiduciary responsibility of public trust committed by an individual or
organization, usually during the course of legitimate occupational
activity, by persons of high or respectable social status for personal or
organizational gain." 7

In order to accept this definition or any other concept of
white-collar crime, there are some theoretical underpinnings that
should be understood. A very important issue is how a corporation
can actually commit an offense or be held liable. After all, a
corporation is not a human being that can physically commit a crime
or be jailed; instead, it is a legal entity and its bylaws do not provide
for the commission of illegal acts.8 Nevertheless, many legal systems
have recognized the "person" aspect of a corporation and have
accordingly bestowed this status upon them. 9 A common way to
(Mike Maguire ed., 2001); MICHAEL L. BENSON & SALLY S.
SIMPSON, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 5 (Chester Britt et al eds., 2009).
WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2
5

EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 9 (1949).

6 David

Nelken, White-Collar and Corporate Crime, in The Oxford Handbook of
Criminology 628 (Mike Maguire et al eds., 5th ed. 2012).
FRIEDRICHS, supra note 4, at 6.
8 Kathleen F. Brickey, Perspectives on Corporate Criminal Liability, in
Encyclopedia of Criminology & Criminal Justice 10-12 (Washington University in
St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-01-02), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1980346; James Gobert, The
Evolving Legal Test of Corporate Criminal Liability, in Corporate and White-collar
Crime 61 (John Minkes & Leonard Minkes eds., 2008).
Gobert, supra note 8, at 63; Amitai Etzioni & Derek Mitchell, Corporate Crime, in
International Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime 187 (Henry N. Pontell
& Gilbert Geis eds., 2007).
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attribute liability to a corporation is through vicarious liability, which
extends the mindset and criminal actions from the employees to the
corporation itself because the employees are agents of the
corporation.1 0
The next logical question is what actions constitute whitecollar crime. Tombs proposed a typology that illustrates the wide
scope, including financial crimes (i.e., tax evasion, bribery, illegal
accounting, etc.), crimes against consumers (i.e., the sale of unfit
goods, false labeling of products, price fixing, etc.), crimes arising
from the employment relationship (ex. violation of antidiscrimination laws, health and safety regulations, or wage laws,
etc.), and crimes against the environment (i.e., pollution of air,
dumping of hazardous waste, etc.).11
A final point regarding white-collar crime is that despite its
emergence as a field, it has not been as widely analyzed as others. A
thorough examination of literature and university courses confirmed
that white-collar crime is generally ignored. 12 What is puzzling about
this trend is that white-collar crime encompasses a wide range of
US courts have long recognized corporate liability for civil actions and such
liability was extended to criminal actions in the landmark Hudson case from 1909.
10

See New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. U.S., 212 U.S. 481 (1909); see
also Matthew O'Brien & Matthew Beck, Corporate Criminal Liability, 37 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 261, 262 (2000); Brickey, supra note 8, at 5; Gobert, supra note 8, at

63. Under the Hudson test, vicarious liability exists if: (1) the individual was acting
within the scope and nature of his or her employment; (2) the individual was acting,
at least in part, to benefit the corporation; and (3) the act and intent was imputed to
the corporation. See Matthew O'Brien & Matthew Beck, Corporate Criminal
Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 265 (2000). It is not just US courts that recognize
vicarious liability. From the UK, see DPP v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd; R v.

ICR Haulage Ltd; Moore v. Bresler Ltd; and Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v. Nattrass. In
contrast to the American courts that have taken a very expansive approach in
attributing the employee's mindset and actions to the corporation, the UK approach
is slightly less broad, as exemplified by the depiction of the "brains" and "hands" of
the corporation: "Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents
who are nothing more than hands to do the work... Others are directors and
managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company and control
what it does. The state of mind of those managers is the state of mind of the
company." See Gobert, supra note 8, at 66.
1 LORRAINE WOLIUTER ET AL., VICTIMOLOGY: VICTIMISATION AND VICTIMS'
RIGHTS 41 (2009)(summarizing the work of Tombs).
12 Danielle McGurrin et al, White Collar Crime Representation in the Criminological
LiteratureRevisited, 2001-2010, 14 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 3 (2013).
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actions and affects many victims. Therefore, it would seem
reasonable to devote more resources to studying white-collar crime.
The focus now shifts to victimology, where a parallel can be
drawn to white-collar crime because both fields developed in the
mid-20th century and have received less attention than more
conventional research areas. Initially, criminal research examined the
offender (who commits crimes and why) and responses (how the
criminal justice system handles offenders, whether incarceration or
rehabilitation is proper). 13 To this end, it was apparent that half of the
pair involved in a criminal action was ignored because little attention
was paid to the victim. 14
Hans von Hentig produced what is seen as the first treatment
of victims in The Criminal and His Victim (1948).15 He suggested that
more weight be attributed to the victim, rather than solely focusing
on the offender. 16 After von Hentig, other scholars began studying
victimology, as reports were produced analyzing victims of specific
offenses such as rape, homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, fraud,
blackmail, and others. 17 Despite this early work, it was not until the
victim movement of the 1970s that victimology appeared in the
limelight, as there was an increased push by activists to address this
issue.18 While traditional notions of victimization emphasized the
individual as victim, some scholars further pushed for broader
definitions to include groups in victimization studies. 19 This is
important to keep in mind regarding the victims of white-collar crime
because it affects more than just individuals.
It is now logical to combine white-collar crime to determine
who the victims of white-collar crime are and how they are
victimized. Unfortunately, these questions have not received much
attention, as the study of victims of white-collar crime have only been
taken up by a minority of scholars, with focus remaining largely on
13 ANDREW KARMEN, CRIME VICTIMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO VICTIMOLOGY

14-15

(7th ed. 2010).
14 Id.
15 Ezzat A. Fattah, Victimology: Past, Present and Future,
33 CRIMINOLOGIE 17, 22
(2000).
16 Id. at 22; KARMEN, supra note 13, at 14-15.
17 Fattah, supra note
15, at 23.
18 KARMEN, supra note 13, at
32.
19 David 0. Friedrichs, Victimology: A Consideration of
the Radical Critique, 29
CRIME DELINQUENCY 283, 288-289 (1983).
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victims of conventional crimes. 20 Nevertheless, the costs of whitecollar crime exceed those of conventional crime. 21 Some studies have
shown that victims incur more economic loss than all conventional
crimes combined and that white-collar crime causes more deaths,

illness, and injuries. 22 Due to this enormous effect that white-collar
crime has on its victims, it is reasonable to pay more attention to
learning about these victims.
When white-collar victimization has been addressed,
information tends to highlight individual victims rather than how
corporations or other groups can be victimized. The FBI has collected
data that indicates that in the majority of white-collar offenses (except
for bribery), the victims are groups other than individual persons. 23
To ignore victims other than individuals would not present an
accurate description of white-collar victimization.
Some conclusions can be drawn about white-collar crime
victimization based on existing research and it is unsurprising that
the scope of victimhood is broad, in light of the fact that there are
numerous offenses falling under white-collar crime. Hazel Croall
provides a useful categorization of white-collar victims: the
government (when victimized by tax evasion, fraud by public
servants, and fraud on public services); organizations (when
victimized through embezzlement, employee theft and other
employee frauds); investors and savers (when victimized by financial
frauds and other offenses that involve pensions, mortgages, and
other financial services); consumers (when victimized by frauds such
as false bargain offers, misleading descriptions, injuries from unsafe
products); workers (when endangered by the employer's neglect of
health and safety regulations); and the public (crimes against the
environment that affect the local communities). 24
20

Steve Tombs & Brian Williams, Corporate Crime and its Victims, in Applied

Criminology 172 (Brian Stout et al eds., 2008); Wolhuter, supra note 11, at 40;
CROALL, supra note 4, at 76; Fattah, supra note 15, at 25; Friedrichs, supra note 19,
at 290.
21

WOLHUTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 42.

Danielle McGurrin & David 0. Ffiedfichs, Victims of Economic Crime on a
GrandScale, 8 JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL DE VICTIMOLOGIE 147, 149 (2010).
23 Cynthia Barnett, The Measurement of White-Collar Crime
Using Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) Data, US Dep't of Justice 5 (2000), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/nibrs wcc.pdf.
24 CROALL, supra note 4, at 84-88.
22
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The purpose of this study is to focus on a specific type of
white-collar crime victim: the corporation. In this sense, the
corporation may act as a "victim-perpetrator" because it is the victim
and the offender at the same time. 25 It might seem odd at first glance
that the corporation can be both, but the Enron case provides an
excellent example. There, the Chief Financial Officer, Andrew
Fastow, was charged with conspiracy, wire fraud, securities fraud,
and other crimes. 26 Enron was the perpetrator because it was
vicariously liable for its employee's actions, but it was also the victim
because the employee defrauded Enron itself. 27 The corporation's role
as a victim is an interesting phenomenon that this current study seeks
to address more in-depth.
III.

THE CURRENT STUDY:

THE CORPORATION

AS VICTIM

OF

WHITE-COLLAR CRIME

A.

Design of the Study

This study was developed by the University of Leipzig and
RolfsPartner and it involved surveying 338 private and public sector
companies of different sizes and from a variety of industries,
including financial, healthcare, IT/telecommunications/media,
construction, automotive, and others. Qualitative and quantitative
methods of research were implemented. The qualitative portion
involved in-depth conversations with representatives from six public
sector companies. Because the strength of the company depends on
the presence of certain prevention instruments, it was necessary to
first determine the occurrence of prevention instruments in the public
sector in comparison to the private sector. To this end, a broad-based
quantitative study was carried out through the use of a standardized
data entry form. 28 Furthermore, the victimization rate was recorded
Alan C. Michaels, Fastow and Arthur Andersen: Some Reflections on Corporate
Criminality, Victim Status, and Retribution, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 551, 552 (2004).
26 Id. at 556.
27 Id.
25

The sample for the quantitative portion of the study was derived from the
Hoppenstedt Managerdatenbank, which is a database that offers information on over
900,000 leaders of German public and private sector companies. See HOPPENSTEDT
MANAGERDATENBANK, http://manager-datenbank.de/ (last visited April 22, 2015).
28
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so that it was possible to examine the impact of the presence of
certain compliance tools on the crime rate within the company.
B.

Analysis of the Quantitative Results

For the quantitative part of the study, five hypotheses were
derived from the past state of research and from basic assumptions of
victimology. Also central to the development of these hypotheses is
the fact that German public sector companies are required to
implement certain compliance tools whereas private sector
companies are not.2 9 According to the first hypothesis, if a
corporation belongs to the public sector, there are more compliance
tools available than in the private sector. However, the data showed
that the public sector is generally not better equipped than the
private sector in regards to compliance. This is demonstrated by the
following diagram:

We developed a list of certain criteria that was most important for our study,
including the desire to engage with leaders that had a legal or compliance
background. This led to telephone calls and emails with 1,776 managers that
represented a variety of different companies. The contacts were given a description
of the research project, including a link to an anonymous platform where they could
fill out our survey. This took place between May 1, 2011 and October 1, 2011. In the
end, 338 public and private sector companies fully participated in the study, which
allowed valuable insights to be drawn.
29 STEFFEN

SALVENMOSER,

ET AL, KRIMINALITAT IM OFFENTLICHEN SEKTOR

2010: AUF DER SPUR VON KORRUPTION UND Co. 42 (2010).
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D.1 Equipment with Prevention Tools
100%
84
80%

83
75

78

72

70

62
60%
47

43

44

40%

20%

0%

Code of Conduct

Employee
Training

Compliance
Organization

Whistleblower
System

Zero Tolerance
Policy

Type of Compliance Tool
*Public Sector
Private Sector

Although certain compliance measures are implemented
more frequently in the public sector, the difference of two to five
percentage points is negligible at best. However, a significant
difference was found in regards to the creation of a code of conduct.
Here, the public sector lags behind the private sector by 20%. The
only area within the realm of a code of conduct where the public
sector has a distinct advantage over the private sector is in regards to
employee training. If a code of conduct exists, 84% of the companies
in the public sector hold training on its content. By contrast, "only"
75% do so in the private sector.
The second hypothesis claims that if crime is discovered, then
the response from the public sector company is to file a criminal
complaint. German public law requires such companies to report an
offense in so far as it is an offense of some gravity and a suspect is
named.3 0 This hypothesis is verified if these guidelines are
implemented in practice.
30 For examples of German laws regulating the public sector, see
Korruptionsbekimpfungsrichtlinie
Bayern, available at http://www.gesetzebayem.de/jportal/portal/page/bsbayprod.psml?showdoccase=1&doc.id=VVBYVVBYOOOO 19675&doc.part=X&doc.origin=bs&st-vv;
see
also
Verwaltungsvorschrift

Korruptionsvorbeugung

Sachsen,

available

at

180

U. MIAMI INT'L &

COMP. L. REv.

V. 22

The first step in testing this hypothesis involved determining
the general crime rates, while taking care to distinguish between
cases of occupational and corporate crime. 31 Because the term
occupational crime refers to crimes of employees done to the
detriment of the employer, a victimization of the company still exists
in this respect. The victimization in the public and private sectors is
distributed as follows:

D.2.1 Victimization Rate: Public Sector

shk

32%

68%

* Victimization

No Victimization

&

http://www.sicherheit.sachsen.de/download/SMI/VwV Korruptionsvorbeugung.pdf;
see also Korruptionsbek~impfungsgesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen, available at
https://recht.nrw.de/1mi/owa/br bestext?anwnr=2&gldnr=-2&uglnr=-20020&bes
id=6824&menu=1&sg=O&aufgehoben=N.
31 Clinard and Quinney defined occupational crime as a "violation of the legal codes
in the course of activity in a legitimate occupation." See MARSHALL CLINARD
RIcHARD QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS: A TYPOLOGY 131 (2d ed. 1973).
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D.2.2 Victimization Rate: Private Sector

37%

63%

* Victimization

No Victimization

The conclusion to be drawn is that the victimization rate is
lower in the public sector than the private sector. However, there is
only a slight difference of five percentage points. It is likely the
difference is due to the control paradox and indirectly confirms the
hypothesis that the control mechanisms in the public sector have a
smaller effect. Therefore, occupational crime in the public sector does
not occur less frequently than in the private sector; it is just rarely
detected and thus remains in the dark. Relating to corporate crime
(offense to the detriment of a third party), the following picture
emerges:

182
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D.3.1 Corporate Crime
in the Public Sector

91%9

I Corporate Crime

No Corporate Crime

D.3.2 Corporate Crime
in the Private Sector
10%

90%

I Corporate Crime

No Corporate Crime

According to these diagrams, it is clear that corporate crime is
equally distributed in the public and private sectors. The validity of
the responses is questionable though because the number of reported
crimes at the expense of a third party is very low. In addition, we
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determined during the course of the interviews that the willingness
of the people surveyed to report victimization seemed greater than
the willingness to confess to offenses committed to the detriment of
third parties. Despite our assurances of maximum anonymity, many
contacts expressed fear during the telephone interviews that their
responses could allow somebody to detect the company's identity.
To further test the hypothesis, only those companies that
reported victimization have been considered (in other words, in
accordance with the diagram on victimization rate). Of interest is the
response to the noticed victimization. It was expected that there
would be a greater willingness to report in the public sector due to
the existing obligations under German law. 3 2 In reality, there was no
difference between the groups, as private and public sector
companies filed criminal charges in 52% of the cases of discovered
victimization.

32

See German regulations, supra note 30.
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D.4.1 Reaction to Victimization:
Public Sector

48%
52%

* Criminal Complaint Filed

No Criminal Complaint Filed

D.4.2 Reaction to Victimization:
Private Sector

48%h

* Criminal Complaint Filed

h

~52%o

No Criminal Complaint Filed

This highlights that the public sector does not respond to
victimization more frequently than the private sector. Therefore, the
second hypothesis cannot be confirmed. Whether and to what extent
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the application of labor law measures makes a difference is tested in
the context of the fourth hypothesis, which will be dealt with later.
The third hypothesis assumes that the victimization risk is
lower if compliance tools, a compliance organization, and reporting
requirements are implemented. The following table summarizes the
effect of compliance tools:
Prevention
Level
Primary

Type of action

*

Prevention of crime

through lack of
knowledge of the
boundaries between
permitted and
prohibited behavior
*

Compliance Tools

*

*

Effect on the value
orientation of the
employees

Code of Conduct
Employee training
on compliance
products and
criminal law
related issues
Anti-corruption
training program

*Sharpening awareness
of the issues of
compliance and crime
prevention
Secondary

oversight of
threatened legal
interests

*Improving

Increase of the risk of
detection
Tertiary

*

Consistent sanctioning
of discovered
violations

*

*

Existence of a
compliance
organization
Existence of a
whistleblower
system

*

Zero tolerance
strategy

*

Introduction of
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criminal and labor
law measures
According to the assumptions in the table above, these
compliance tools improve the standard knowledge of employees,
affect their value orientation, provide for a higher standard of
awareness, and create a more complete oversight of the threatened
legal interests. This should reduce the risk of victimization in the long
term, which should be verified by the third hypothesis.
To verify this hypothesis, the effects of individual compliance
tools on the victimization rate were analyzed. These tools include
codes of conduct, employee training, whistleblower and zero
tolerance policies, compliance organizations, and reporting
obligations. The following diagram confirms that public sector
companies that do not have a code of conduct report victimization
less frequently. The diagram highlights a 22% victimization rate in
public sector companies that do not have a code of conduct versus a
45% victimization rate in public sector companies that do have a code
of conduct:
D.5 Victimization Probability Depending on the Presence of
a Code of Conduct: Public Sector
100%
78
80%

60%
45
40%
22
20%

0%

Code of Conduct
* Victimization

No Code of Conduct
No Victimization
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A comparable picture emerges in the private sector. There,
victimization was reported in 28% of the companies where no code of
conduct was present and in 42% of the cases where there was a code
of conduct.
In regards to employee training, the same trend is noticeable
in the public sector: if no training is performed, the victimization rate
is lower. The diagram below illustrates this point by showing that
victimization occurred in 40% of the cases where no employee
training was held while a higher victimization rate of 46% happened
in public sector companies that did implement some sort of employee
training.
D.6 Victimization Probability Depending on
Implementation of Employee Training: Public Sector
100%
80%
60
60%

54
46
40

40%
20%
0%

Employee Training
*Victimization

No Employee Training
No Victimization

By contrast to the public sector highlighted above, the
distribution is the opposite in the private sector: there was
victimization in 41% of the cases where training courses were
regularly held, but victimization was observed in 46% of the cases
where no training took place.
A similar trend emerges concerning whistleblower systems.
In the public sector, victimization is detected more frequently if there
is a whistleblower system. The diagram below reflects these results
by showing that victimization is revealed in 38% of the public sector

188
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companies that employ a whistleblower system in comparison to a
lower rate of 2 6 % in public sector companies that lack this
mechanism.
D.7 Victimization Probability Depending on the Presence of
a Whistleblower System: Public Sector
100%
74

80%
62
60%
38
40%
26
20%

0%

Whistleblower System
0 Victimization

No Whistleblower System
No Victimization

The distribution is similar in the private sector. Victimization
was observed in 42% of the cases where there was a whistleblowing
system compared to 34% in companies that had no such system.
If the public sector company has a zero tolerance policy,
victimization is more frequently observed by a difference of 17
percentage points. The diagram below confirms this by
demonstrating that victimization is noted in 37% of public sector
companies that utilize a zero tolerance policy in relation to 2 0% of
public sector companies that do not employ this policy.
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D.8 Victimization Probability Depending on the Company's
Zero Tolerance Policy: Public Sector
100%

80
80%
63
60%
37
40%
20
20%

0%

Zero Tolerance Policy
0 Victimization

No Zero Tolerance Policy
No Victimization

However, this difference is not as strong in the private sector.
If a zero tolerance policy is implemented, 39% of the private sector
companies reported victimization. If no zero tolerance policy is
implemented, victimization was detected in 33% of the cases, thereby
producing a difference of only six percentage points.
With regard to the presence of a compliance organization in
public sector companies, the victimization rate is not much different
regardless of whether there is an organization or not (32% versus
31%, as shown in the diagram below).
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D.9 Victimization Probability Depending on the Presence of
a Compliance Organization: Public Sector
100%

80%

69

68

60%

40%

32

31

20%

0%

Compliance Organization
0 Victimization

No Compliance Organization
No Victimization

On the other hand, the difference between the presence of a
compliance organization and the lack thereof is stronger in the
private sector. If there is a compliance organization, 39% reported
victimization. If there is none, victimization was found in 28% of
cases. This produces a difference of eleven percentage points.
Concerning the obligation to report violations to the
supervisory board, if a director of compliance exists in the company,
he/she has a reporting obligation to the executive board in
approximately 95% of the cases, but only 16% of the cases require
reporting to the supervisory board. If a public sector company
requires a report to the supervisory board, victimization occurs in
57
% of the cases. In the absence of such a reporting requirement, only
29% of public sector companies are victimized.
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D.10 Victimization Probability Depending on the Existence
of Reporting Requirements of the Compliance Officer to
the Board: Public Sector
100%
80%

71
57

60%
43
40%

29

20%
0%

Reporting Requirement
0 Victimization

No Reporting Requirement
No Victimization

The results differ in the private sector. If there is a reporting
obligation, victimization occurs in 43% of the cases. This contrasts to
4 0 % in cases where there is no reporting requirement, thereby
producing a fairly small difference of only three percentage points.
With regard to the individual compliance elements, the third
hypothesis does not hold because the victimization rate is always
higher when the elements are implemented in the company. Thus,
individual instruments only improve the detection risk of crime and
do not act as primary prevention tools that can prevent victimization.
However, a different picture arises when all compliance instruments
are viewed as a whole, rather than as an individual instrument.
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D.11 Victimization Probability Depending on the Presence
of all the Above-Mentioned Compliance Tools: Public and
Private Sectors
100%
80%

75

69

60%
40%

31
25

20%
0%

All Compliance Tools
0 Victimization

No Compliance Tools
No Victimization

This diagram concludes that the sum of the compliance tools
leads to effective prevention in both the public and private sectors.
By considering all compliance tools together, the victimization risk is
significantly lower than companies that have not implemented
compliance tools. Companies that have comprehensive victimization
protection not only recognize the offenses committed against them,
but they also appear to reduce the risk of victimization altogether.
Hypothesis four asserts that if a company commits to a zero
tolerance policy and handles all forms of corporate crime with
criminal charges and/or labor law measures, then this strategy is
implemented consistently. A two-step approach was applied to test
this hypothesis. In the first step, we questioned which type of zero
tolerance policy is used (i.e. how does your company respond to a
compliance violation?). Here, multiple answers were possible,
including issuing a warning, terminating employment, filing criminal
charges, or taking an individual decision. This was followed by
questioning whether an investigation was launched against the
perpetrator and/or whether labor law measures were taken. This
information allows a comparison and consideration of whether the
zero tolerance policy is actually implemented. The following diagram
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indicates how public sector companies implement their zero
tolerance policy:
D.12 Implementation of the Zero Tolerance Policy: Public
Sector
100%
79

80%
60%

56

56

Termination of
Employment

Criminal Complaint

46
40%
20%

0%

Warning

Individual Case
Decision

Unsurprisingly, individual case decisions are the most
frequent response in the public sector. A labor or criminal law action
occurs in only half the cases. The situation is similar when comparing
the results to the private sector, but here it seems to be less severe. An
individual decision was reported by 82% of the private sector
companies surveyed, a warning was reported in 37% of the cases, a
complaint was filed in 39% of the cases, and 48% of the companies
surveyed indicated that they considered terminating employment in
response to compliance violations.
The second step in our methodology relates to the actual
response to compliance violations. These diagrams demonstrate that
labor law measures occur in the majority of cases involving public
sector companies.
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D.13.1 Response by Labor Law Measures: Public Sector

*Labor Law Measures

No Labor Law Measures

D.13.2 Response by Criminal Law Measures: Public Sector

42%

58%

I Criminal Law Measures

No Criminal Law Measures

However, the following picture emerges if one considers a
combination of both a criminal and labor law measure:
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D.14 Combined Reaction to Victimization: Public Sector

I Criminal Procedure or Labor Law Measures

No Reaction

The public sector company responds to compliance violations
in 84% of the cases. The distribution is similar in the private sector,
with labor measures in 85% of the cases and criminal charges in 53%
of the cases. Looking at the total number of reactions, there is a
response in 92% of the cases through labor or criminal law measures.
Contrary to expectations, the private sector responds more
consistently against victimization than the public sector.
The final hypothesis postulates that if compliance is perceived
as inefficient, then no prevention tools are implemented, despite the
company experiencing victimization. This can also be termed
"learned helplessness," which means that compliance measures are
omitted despite victimization because managers perceive
victimization as inevitable and consider any defense hopeless.33 The
first step in analyzing this hypothesis is to consider whether
victimization prevention tools are lacking. The second step then
contemplates the perceived effectiveness.

33

For an overview of "learned helplessness" see MARTIN

HJLFSLOSIGKEIT (4th ed. 2011).

SELIGMAN, ERLERNTE
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D.15 Number of implemented prevention tools depending on the
experienced victimization in the Public Sector
Number
implemented
prevention tools

of Number
of public
sector
companies
experiencing
victimization

Percent

0

1

4.3

1

2

8.7

2

4

17.4

3

4

17.4

4

3

13

5

8

34.8

6

1

4.3

Total

23*

100

*The total of public sector companies surveyed was 72 and 23 of these
reported experiencing victimization

In the public sector, there is only one company that
experienced victimization without implementing any compliance
tools, which amounts to 4.3% of the public sector companies that
experienced victimization. In the private sector, the rate at which
companies experienced victimization without implementing
compliance tools is slightly higher at 7.1%. Considering the perceived
effect of the compliance elements, the following picture emerges of
the public sector:
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D.16 Assessment of the Crime Rate Since the Introduction
of Compliance Measures: Public Sector
8%

18%

2%

1!

72%

*Increased

Remained the Same

Decreased

* Not Specified

The conclusion is that compliance efficiency is estimated to be
low. A majority of the surveyed companies in the public sector
assume that the introduction of prevention tools does not alter the
frequency of incidents in the long term. Few believe that the
incidence of compliance violations increased and a greater
proportion (18%) think that there was a decline. In total, 74%
consider the efficiency of prevention tools to be low. When compared
with the private sector, 12% are of the opinion that the number of
compliance violations has increased, 5 8 % believe it has stayed the
same, and 19% think it has decreased. The private sector also
considers the efficiency of compliance to be low.
The subjective beliefs of the respondents concerning the effect
of compliance tools differ materially from the findings collected in
this study. There is thus a need for clarification regarding the effect of
compliance tools. An increase in the victimization rate is a positive
effect of compliance tools because the company can actively react to
its experienced victimization, rather than having its victimization
remain hidden. Coordinated compliance tools create prevention
effects that help companies refrain from committing occupational
crimes. This effect is obviously underestimated by those companies
affected and fosters the "learned helplessness" motif rather than
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contributing to an expansion and improvement of the compliance
system.
C.

Analysis of the Qualitative Results

In addition to the quantitative portion of this study, a
qualitative survey was also undertaken, which led to concrete
knowledge about circumstances surrounding victimization. 34 This
involved holding conversations with current and former high-level
representatives of six German public sector companies that had
experienced victimization. We assured the anonymity of the
conversation partners in an effort to encourage a free-flowing
discourse.35 What follows here is a summary of what the
conversation partners revealed during the course of our dialogue. We
will see that control instruments were formally available to the public
sector companies, but that there were shortcomings in their design
that led to significantly reduced resistance at the time of
victimization. This reduced strength enabled not only a singular
victimization, but also allowed the perpetrators to harm the company
in the long-term through multiple committed acts of fraud.
According to our partners, a variety of characteristics contributed to
their company's victimization:

1.

Control by a Second Manager

Insofar as the company had a second manager, a difference in
power existed between the first manager (who acted as a perpetrator)
and the second manager, so long as it was not the case where the
perpetrator and second manager were acting in collusion (as was

34 The methodology of the qualitative portion of this study followed the research
principles developed by Roland Girtler. Here, we utilized the "ero-epic dialogue"
method of conversing with our partners, which emphasizes the equality of the
interviewer and interviewee. In other words, both parties are on the same footing and
actively participate in the dialogue through the posing of questions. This hopefully
produces a more agreeable atmosphere that allows the conversation partner to open
up. For a more detailed overview of this method of research, see ROLAND GIRTLER,
METHODEN DER FELDFORSCHUNG (4th ed. 2001),
35 The conversation partners were chosen by the leaders of this study through their
own personal contacts. Their willingness to engage in the qualitative study is greatly
appreciated.
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reported in one case). Thus, controls such as the "Four Eyes
Principle" 36 did not occur on equal footing between the two
managers. The non-criminally acting manager was responsible for a
less significant business area, so he obtained no insight into the
business politics and occupationally relevant areas controlled by the
perpetrator. In other words, he/she was effectively iced out.
Therefore, the second manager was marginalized and had to submit
to the perpetrator because the perpetrator radiated power and had an
aura of sanctity about him/her.
Our conversation partners also reported that the perpetrator
established a good network into local politics, business, and the
community. Accusations or complaints of wrongdoing were
perceived as risky for one's own progress because nobody could
oppose the social capital of the perpetrator. By contrast, the loyalty of
other employees was obviously rewarded. This resulted in workrelated subcultures, where members created the impression to the
outside world that all was right. Even where the company's bylaws
required a "Four Eyes Principle" as a limitation on managers during
certain business activities, this was disregarded or did not take place
on equal footing, so that a substantive review by the second manager
did not occur.
Similar results occurred where the wrongful acts were
committed by an executive. The department, which was led by the
perpetrator, was hermetically isolated against any controls or
limitations. Inquiries that were too critical of the executive's actions
were avoided because the company depended on this executive.
Furthermore, the executive was granted many freedoms because
he/she had led the department with good commercial success.
2.

Control by a Supervisory Board

Public sector companies possess another control mechanism
in the form of a supervisory board. While experts sent to the
The Four Eyes Principle refers to the idea that two different people should approve
important management decisions (hence, four eyes). See Jan Theodor Schickora,
36

Bringing the Four-Eyes-Principleto the Lab, MUNICH

2011-3, availableat http://epub.ub.unimuenchen.de/12160/1/The4EPSchikora.pdf.
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supervisory board should have appropriate skills and experience, our
conversation partners noted that in practice, a large number of
supervisory board positions were occupied by members who came
from a variety of professions that were not necessarily related to the
required insights associated with the management of a public
company.
They also revealed that supervisory board members rarely
questioned the actions of the manager. This was especially true when
the numbers added up and the company was economically
successful. The supervisory board members put the manager in a
position of comfort and did not question the information at all or did
not question the information sufficiently. In some instances, a good
personal relationship existed between the manager and certain
supervisory board members as a result of belonging to the same
political party, which further precluded critical inquiries.
3.

Control by a Works Council

Insofar as the company mandated a works council or similar
employee organization, no economic committee was formed despite
this being required under German law. 37 Therefore, the works council

received no information about the economic and financial situation of
the company and was not in a position to critically question certain
business transactions. 38 The manager effectively eliminated any
advances in this direction so that a bottom-up control vacuum was
clear. In essence, the works council was not terribly effective.
4.

Control by an Auditor

According to our conversation partners, routine audits were
carried out within the company in accordance with German law. 39
The representatives of the majority shareholder, who issued the order
for the audit, preferred smaller regional accounting firms that had no
special expertise in the investigation of corporate crime. Insofar as
37 § 106 BetrVG requires the formation of an economic committee in all companies
with more than one-hundred permanently employed workers.
38 § 106 (3)(1) BetrVG specifically mentions the economic and financial
situation of
the company as being the type of information that should be presented to the
economic committee.
39 § 53 (1)(1) HGrG provides that an audit of a company may be requested.
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suspicious allegations were mentioned in the report, these were not
investigated or the investigation amounted to nothing because the
auditors did not further question the explanations given by the
manager.
5.

Control by Changed Problem Awareness or Emergence
of a CharismaticGuard

A turning point in the company's victimization was identified
in every situation mentioned by our conversation partners, which
was attributable to changed awareness by a single manager or the
emergence of a charismatic guard. In complex situations, changing
awareness of the problem tipped the balance in favor of more
intensive controls. This was conveyed in one instance, where anticorruption training imparted the required knowledge to the manager
that allowed him to correctly classify a legal situation and to connect
the existing suspicions to further investigations.
Certain common characteristics were gathered in the
instances where charismatic guards emerged. They were experts in
economic affairs, personally and economically independent, and
were committed to traditional values. They were in some way
involved with the victim company, such as holding a position in the
supervisory board or representing the majority shareholder. This
person was suspicious of the perpetrator and had a lower tolerance
for inconsistencies in annual reports, information, or responses from
the perpetrator in regards to certain transactions or unanswered
questions in the auditors' reports. This person was ready to get to the
bottom of the incident in question. Insofar as resistance was
encountered, this person's iron will did not allow any room for
stonewalling or other tactics.
In his or her work, the charismatic guard accessed business
documents and tried to gain clarity through information from
employees and the questioning of suspects. Before taking further
steps, the charismatic guard informed the competent bodies of the
suspicions, which triggered compulsory action by the representatives
of the majority shareholder and other members of the supervisory
board. In the surveyed cases brought to light by our conversation
partners, the final consequence involved both labor law measures
being implemented, as well as criminal charges being filed.
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Typology of Companies According to
Victimization Risk

The results of this study allow for the creation of a victim
typology of companies:
Victim
Typology

Compliance
Instruments

Fraud

Discovery

Company's
Risk

Victimization
Degree

Step 1:
Unprotected

No
compliance
instruments
implemented

Fundament
ally in the
dark

By chance,
no
systematic
discovery

Information is
uncontrolled
and often
anonymously
given to the
corporate
bodies or
directly to the
press / very
high
reputational
risk

High on all
three levels,
often
undiscovered

Step 2:
Semiprotected

Few
compliance
instruments,
in particular
without a
structured
whistle
blowing
system

Partially in
the light,
partially in
the dark

By chance,
still based
on
insufficient
systematic
instruments

Information is
more likely
given to
corporate
bodies
directly than
to the press /
still high
reputational
risk

High on
primary and
secondary
levels, the
introduced
instruments on
the third level
controversial

Step 3:
Protected

All relevant
compliance
instruments
and
inclusively
structured
whistle
blowing
system recently
implemented

Extensively
in the light,
through the
overall
efficacy but
filled with a
rise of cases

Systematic
instruments
operate, the
rest by
chance

Increased
detection rate
through more
cases, but risk
tends to be
controlled

High on the
primary level,
low on the
secondary
level,
significant risk
at the tertiary
level of
miscalculation
of the findings
as a perceived
increase

Step 4:
Professionall
y protected

All relevant
compliance
instruments
and

Extensively
in the light

Systematic
instruments
function

Consistently
high
discovery and
detection rate,

Reduced on all
three levels
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reduced risk
and well
controlled

-

inclusively
structured
whistle
blowing
system
effectively
implemented
for awhile
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E.

Leaving the Victim Role Behind

In accordance with the table above, a company should
determine which typology level they are at, regardless of whether the
company has knowingly been victimized. Based on this diagnosis,
there is a need for action to determine how the ideal level of Step 4
can be reached. The following table lists possible destabilizing factors
while recommending a course of action:
Personnel and organizational
destabilizing factors
Competence deficits manifest
themselves in outdated and
deficient bylaws, guidelines,
and operating procedures and
protocols of meetings of
shareholders and board
members.

Recommendations for action

Development or revision of legal
and procedural aspects

Control vacuum of
management and overriding of
control principles by:
*

Insufficient documentation
of management decisions.

*

Single knowledge about
decision-relevant reasons.

*

Fraud, or fraud risks are

Full and transparent
documentation of
management decisions and
management meetings, as
well as ensuring the filing
and archiving.
*

Regular review of the
adequacy of management
and business processes by
independent internal or
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not recognized due to the
lack of a separate,
independent review body.
*

Ineffective Four Eyes
Principle as a control
function for the joint
representation by
management and proxies.

*

The casting of supervisory
committee positions takes
place according to political
criteria and less according
to qualitative criteria.

*

"Weak" works council.

Lack of compliance tools or
deficits in compliance
management system:
*

Lack of reporting channel
for whistleblowers

*

Missing or incomplete
regulations for employees
and suppliers

*

Lack of monitoring of the
prevention effect

*

V. 22

external auditors who are
experienced in fraud
investigations.
*

Achieving a balance of
personalities, dissolution of
cliques and spoils systems,
for example, by the
appointment of additional
full-time or part-time
management or proxies,
qualification training
opportunities for works
councils.

*

Casting of supervisory
positions with independent
and competent persons.

*

Establishment of a
whistleblower reporting
system, for example, a
whistleblower hotline or
ombudsperson

*

Creation/supplementation of
a code of conduct for
employees and suppliers and
others with auditing rights in
cases of suspected noncompliance

*

Regular compliance and
fraud reporting to the
supervisory board

*

Regular compliance audits,
monitoring of the

Workplace- related and
supplier-related
subcultures
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effectiveness and
development of compliance
products for sustainability
assurance
III.

CONCLUSION

White-collar crime and victimization are two areas within
criminology that have produced some research, but could still use
more. The purpose of this study was to address certain gaps
pertaining to corporate crime and victimization and to assess the role
of compliance measures. In particular, this study focused on the role
of the company as a victim of corporate crime. Through the
presentation of the results, a clearer picture has emerged. In
particular, the implementation of certain compliance tools is a vital
step in discovering victimization of the company. Moreover, an
effective and sustainable compliance program is needed for the longterm health of the company in an effort to ensure that the company
does not end up in a victim career. It is therefore not surprising that it
is in the best interests of both private and public sector companies to
assess their prevention levels and determine which compliance tools
will
help
them
best
achieve
maximum
protection.

